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FOREWORD

The 1991 Civil Rights Act: A Constitutional,
Statutory, and Philosophical Enigma
Douglas W. KmiecThe subject of this Symposium issue---civil rights-remains a
particularly timely and important one, and one that has a long
history and association with the University of Notre Dame. It was
from Notre Dame, after all, that Father Theodore Hesburgh both
entered the governmental arena of civil rights and exited it; and, I
do not think he would mind my saying, in both cases, "fired with
enthusiasm." The Civil Rights Commission on which Father
Hesburgh served with commitment and distinction from 1957 to
1972 was a political compromise, a delegation to committee if you
will, largely to 'avoid an issue thought too sensitive (as embarrassingly late as 1957) to be legislatively handled. The initial work of
the Commission focused on voting rights, but with Father Ted's
prompting, and ultimately under his chairmanship, the Commission addressed employment, housing, education, administration of
justice, and public accommodations. Father Ted describes the difficult task confronting the Civil Rights Commission of the 1950s
and 1960s in his recent autobiography:
It may seem hard to believe now, but in the late fifties and

early sixties, we were just as bad about public accommodations
in this country as they were in South Africa. Practically every-"
thing was for whites only-drinking fountains, rest rooms, drugstores, hotels, beaches, churches, cemeteries, barber shops,
lunch counters, clothing stores, and schools ....
Where blacks were permitted to tread, they were carefully
segregated. They were allowed to travel on city buses, but had
to ride in the back. They could go to the movies, but had to
sit in the balcony. When federal agricultural subsidies were
distributed by all-white county governments, the white farmers
got all the federal aid, the black farmers got nothing. . .. '
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Not surprisingly, the conditions that afflicted minority citizens
were visited upon the Commission and the witnesses called to
testify before it. The Commission, itself, because it had minority
membership and staff, was denied accommodations in hotels and
even military bases. Witnesses were harassed. At one point in 1959,
the Commission was enjoined from conducting hearings by a federal judge in Louisiana. Again, Father Ted and Notre Dame facilitated the progress of Civil Rights by transporting the Commission
to a Notre Dame retreat house, where the atmosphere of conviviality, indeed humanity, was so pervasive that the Commission was
able to submit a virtually unanimous report to President Eisenhower.
The legacy of Notre Dame's involvement with civil rights continues today, not only with this Symposium, but also through the
Center for Civil and Human Rights, which is an active archive for
the papers of the Civil Rights Commission-or as Father Ted fondly calls it, "The Civil Rights Commission in Exile."
Father Hesburgh makes two observations in his autobiography
that will help us focus on the 1991 Act. First, while acknowledging
that all the problems of racial inequality have not been solved,
Father Hesburgh submits "apartheid in the United States disappeared forever with the passage of [the Civil Rights Act] in 1964
and it will never come back."2 In this, he declares, and we certainly can hope that he is correct, that intentional discrimination
has been disclosed in public law for what it is: fundamentally immoral. In the natural law tradition of this law school, such discrimination is a wholesale disregard of the fact that each of us, regardless of color or race, has been created in God's image. To intentionally discriminate is to deny this nature, and to act against
one's own nature is a denial of reason.
Father Hesburgh's second observation is a bit more troubling.
He reports that shortly before the 1970 midterm elections, the
Civil Rights Commission completed its report on civil rights within
the federal government. He writes:
No subjective criteria were used. All the findings were based
strictly on statistics and empirical data that could be easily
tabulated and verified, such as the number of blacks employed
in each department or agency. The report was in no way an

2

Id. at 206.
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attempt to embarrass the administration. But it did.'
This report led some two years later to Father Hesburgh's separation from the Commission. He stands by it, and he should, if
the statistics reveal actual intentional discrimination on the basis of
race or the other prohibited categories under the 1964 Act. Yet if
the statistics are not premised upon intentional discrimination, but
are merely reflective of legitimate employment inquiries or practices, to use mere statistical imbalances as evidence of discrimination
is more problematic.
And so we edge closer to the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the
controversies surrounding its enactment and interpretation. To not
put too fine a point on it, the nagging question that lingers behind much of the controversy surrounding the enactment under
focus in this Symposium is whether the absence of preference on
the basis of race can be statutorily, constitutionally, or morally
characterized as discrimination.
A failure to fully explore this issue tends to produce statutory,
constitutional, and philosophical muddle. First, focus on the
statutory puzzle. As I have written elsewhere:
Employers [can be] alleged to discriminate when they do
nothing more than reasonably require a high school diploma
as a condition of employment. If more white applicants than
black happen to be high school graduates in the local community, an employment discrimination lawsuit is likely. Employers can raise their particular employment goals or the purposes
served by the educational qualification, but it is often unavailing. In effect, these employers are presumed to have "discriminated" if there is a statistical racial imbalance [between their
workforces and the relevant labor market]. The fact that the
statistical disparity could be traced to any one of thousands of
factors from geography to work commuting distance to more
attractive job choices competing for the same labor pool largely
doesn't matter.4
It was this concern, of course, that led President Bush to veto the
forerunner of the 1991 Act. The President observed that
[p]rimarily through provisions governing cases in which employment practices are alleged to have unintentionally caused
the disproportionate exclusion of members of certain groups,

3 Id. at 208.
4 DOUGLAS W. KMIEc, THE AToRNEY GENERAL's LAwYER 164-65 (1992).
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the [1990 Act] creates powerful incentives for employers to
adopt hiring and promotion quotas. These incentives are created by the bill's new and very technical rules of litigation, which
will make it difficult for employers to defend legitimate employment practices. In many cases, a defense against unfounded
allegations will be impossible.'
Professor Rotunda nicely sketches the outlines of the "very
technical rules of litigation," as the President called them, that resurfaced in the 1991 Act, which-somewhat mysteriously-the
President signed nonetheless. Professor Rotunda rightly reflects
that the convoluted nature of the 1991 Act will impose significant
costs on both employers and employees.' By this, I take it, he
means mostly economic cost, but there are significant constitutional costs as well. For starters, it might be wondered how Congress could justify the Act under the Constitution, especially in
light of the strong disavowal of class legislation by the text and
history of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 This question becomes
even more intriguing when it is coupled with the fact that the
modem Supreme Court has unequivocally held that to prove a
violation of constitutional equal protection, there must be evidence of discriminatory intent.8
Technically, this constitutional quandary was one not directly
posed by the text of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The statutory language of the 1964 Act, it will be recalled, required proof of discriminatory intent. In a nutshell, the Act made it unlawful to "discriminate ...
because of race.' Indeed, when the sponsor of Title
VII was pressed to assure the Senate that the legislation would not
be used to sanction racial quotas and preferences wherever a work
force was statistically imbalanced, Senator Hubert Humphrey stated

5 Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 1990,
1990 PUB. PAPERS 1437, 1438 (Oct. 22, 1990).
6 Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Ad of 1991: A Brief Inlrodudoy Analysis of the
Congmional r
toJudicial Inkretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 923, 925 (1993).
7 The Senate sponsor described the amendment as intended to "abolish all class
legislation and do away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code
not applicable to another." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement
of Senator Howard). Similarly, Senator Wilson pointed out- 'we have advocated the rights
of the black man because the black man was the most oppressed; but we mean that the
poorest man, be he black or white, ...
is as much entitled to the protection of the law
as the richest and the proudest man in the land." Id. at 343.
8 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 434 U.S. 1025
(1978); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
9 Pub. L No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 240, 253 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988)).

1993]

FOREWORD

that the bill "does not provide that any quota systems may be
established to maintain racial balance in employment. In fact, the
itle... prohibit[s] preferential treatment for any particular
group, and any person, whether or not a member of any minority
group. "1 To further emphasize the point, it was explicitly provided in Title VII that nothing in the legislation should be interpreted to require preferential treatment because of race."
Thus, when Father Hesburgh was toiling in government's civil
rights garden, the focus was not impact, but intent. Neither the
Constitution nor the 1964 statute said otherwise. However, in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 2 the Supreme Court sweepingly opined
that Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
3
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."
Thus began a judicial odyssey of statutory disfiguration that continues to this day. Justice Scalia has characterized the process as a
transformation in favor of racial bias; moving toward proportionate
representation in the workplace. 4 When the statutory transformation slowed in 1989, most noticeably in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio95 where the Court required job applicants to at least specifically identify the employment qualification that they thought
discriminatory and to show that it served no business purpose, the
1991 Civil Rights Act resulted.
All of the papers that follow assume the 1991 Act's constitutional validity. No one can fault either law professors or practitioners for this bit of practical legal realism. But being practical,
does not make the proposition true. Father Hesburgh once observed sadly that "official slavery coexisted with [Christianity] four
hundred years after the death of Christ. When it reoccurred a
millennium later, Christians were the best customers of the Arab
traders ....
Throughout the world, human dignity and human
rights continued to exist in travesty rather than reality." 6 The
same might be said of the constitutionality of the 1991 Act-that
it, too, exists in travesty, rather than reality.
The two sources of constitutional power that the Act may be
claimed to be premised upon seem unavailing. First, there is
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

.110 CoNG. REc. 11,848 (1964).
Section 7030), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2().
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 431.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
THEoDoRE M. HESBURGH, C.S.C., THE HuMANE IMPERATiVE 25 (1974).
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Congress' so-called section 5 authority to enforce the guarantee of
equal protection. But, as already noted, the contours of equal
protection are bounded by the necessity of showing discriminatory
intent for its violation. True, former Justice Brennan claimed that
Congress has the power to define equal protection in the Fourteenth Amendment differently than the Court. But a majority of
the Court has never formally acceded to Brennan's view because it
fundamentally displaces the Court's article III role to "say what the
law is." And even if Congress has wide latitude to craft its own
racial preference schemes, a narrowly affirmed federal liberality
that still greatly divides the Court and does not extend to the
states, 17 the scope of Congress' authority to undertake such programs in its own right is arguably inapposite to its ability to define
unintentional impacts to be discriminatory practices by private
parties.
The alternative source of congressional power that may be
claimed to underlie the 1991 Act is the power to regulate interstate commerce. The commerce power, of course, played an instrumental role in the validity of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.', But
there, the assertion of authority made some sense. Congress was
rightly concerned about removing impediments to the free flow of
goods and persons that result from intentional racial discrimination. The Hesburgh Civil Rights Commission's difficulties in securing accommodations is illustrative. Admittedly, too, the Court's
Commerce Clause cases hold that Congress may legislate against
individual action under the analytically boundless "cumulative
effect" principle. 9 Yet, as broad as the commerce power is, it is
hard to see how commerce is advanced by de facto racial employment quotas. In actual fact, commerce is very likely burdened, not
advanced, by such social engineering. In all events, whatever the
scope of the commerce power with respect to private parties, Congress should not disregard hornbook equal protection guarantees,
at least with respect to public employers, and those again relate to
intent, rather than impact.
For political reasons and others, these constitutional misgivings are not likely to be soon addressed in court. So disregard the
constitutional muddle, if you will, and turn to the statute. For the

17 Compare Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) with Richmond v.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
18 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
19 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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most part, I will defer the exposition of these difficulties to the
excellent papers that follow. But here are some highlights: Professor Rotunda reveals that the 1991 Act is a case of "planned ambiguity" and that "[t]he inherent result of [this] planned ambiguity
in the Civil Rights Act is unnecessary make-work for lawyers" as
well as increased
and burdensome litigation for employers and
2
employees. 0
Congress left the "business necessity" defense undefined and
the issue of "retroactivity" unaddressed. While Professor Rotunda
highlights the positive aspects of the 1991 Act, including for example, the allowance of some declaratory relief in the context of
mixed motive cases, 21 he correctly bemoans Congress' deliberate
failure to speak with clarity at several critical junctures. This not
only increases litigation and its costs, it distorts the constitutional
structure by forfeiting legislative accountability and inviting the
nonmajoritarian Court to usurp the legislative function.
Professor Devins supplies some behind the scenes explanation
for the political game-playing that resulted in the 1991 Act. It is
not pretty. As he reports, some of the statutory ambiguity may
result not only from the inevitable compromises among political
adversaries, but also from President Bush's ability to be of at least
two minds on the issue of racial preferences: denouncing them as
part of the 1990 Act, praising them in relation to the separate
subject of race-based college scholarships, and then, of course,
seemingly pretending that the tendency toward preference had
somehow been extricated from the 1991 Act.22 In the end,
Devins concludes: Bush's "last minute compromise seemed a complete capitulation because his anti-quota rhetoric was obviously selfcontradictory and self-serving. On too many occasions the President had made the politically expedient choice, making it difficult
to view his 1991 Act compromise as something other than a political sell out."'
In his submission, Attorney Glen Nager suggests that the Act
actually "begs the question of affirmative action in employment."24 In point of fact, Nager finds that the Act creates new

20 Rotunda, suprm note 6, at 927.
21 Id. at 947.
22 Neal Devins, Reagan Redu=. Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NoTRE DAME L REv. 955,
990 (1993).
23 Id. at 999.
24 Glen D. Nager, Affirmative Action After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 68 NOTRE DAME
L1 REV. 1057, 1058 (1993).
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weapons for the opponents of racial preference as well as incentives for employers to institute and expand such efforts. With
respect to the former, the Act precludes "race-norming" or the
adjustment of performance test scores on the basis of race.' In
addition, Nager speculates that section 107 of the 1991 Act, which
makes reliance upon race, sex, or other prohibited categories to
be unlawful even in a mixed motive case, 26 may shift the burden
of proving the legality of a racial or gender preference plan to the
employer, the proponent of the plan. Nager also posits that by
expanding the scope of the race-based prohibition in section 1981
to include the entire employment relationship, not just the making or enforcement of a contract, 27 challenges to racial quotas
and set asides may now be possible under this statute.
On the other side of the ledger is the powerful incentive for
racial preferences driven by the codification of disparate impact
theory already discussed. Increased compensatory and punitive
damage awards and the availability of jury trials seemingly can pull
in both directions favoring or disfavoring preferences depending
upon the plaintiff. Nager admits, however, that this is more likely
to spur racial or gender preference by employers in order to eliminate the most likely plairtiffs. In the end, Nager concludes that
the Act's schizophrenic approach to discriminatory preferences
may be explained, but of course not justified, by an overly narrow
definition of "affirmative action:" formal quotas are forbidden, but
not the logical, quota-producing consequences of the disparate
impact theory.
The next two papers address the implications of the 1991 Act
for sex discrimination. Insofar as one of the political explanations
for the "push me/pull you" character of the Act supplied by
Devins was the timing of the Anita Hill allegations in the Clarence
Thomas confirmation hearings; these investigations are of considerable interest and importance. Marian Haney brings a litigator's
perspective to the existing theories underlying sexual harassment
claims-both quid pro quo and hostile environment. Haney sees
the Act as engendering increased litigation because the new provisions for monetary compensation for harassment are not dependent upon actual lost income. 2' This, too, will complicate or frus25 I. at 1073.
26 Id. at 1073-74.
27 This was the Court's construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989).
28

Marian C. Haney, Litigation of a Sexual Harassment Case After the Civil Rights Act of
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trate good faith settlement attempts. In addition, one of the consequences of allowing for emotional distress recoveries is to put
the plaintiff's mental state in issue. Indeed, Haney observes that
"the court, upon a showing of good cause, may order the plaintiff
to submit to a physical examination by a physician or a mental
examination by a psychologist or physician."' It will be remembered, that a good number of the changes in the political landscape'during the last national election were said to be inspired by
Senator Specter's aggressive questioning of Anita Hill on such
personal subjects. Ironically, the incentives of the Act may be to
have this ordeal replicated across the country.
Professor Jules Gerard approaches the sexual harassment issue
from the vantage point of a First Amendment scholar. Given the
Supreme Court's recent invalidation of certain criminal punishment of hate speech as an impermissible content restriction,'
Gerard inquires whether the federal law prohibiting gender discrimination, and specifically the EEOC guidelines defining sexual
harassment, impermissibly violates the guarantee of free speech. In
a wide-ranging exploration of First Amendment doctrine, Gerard
sees at least overbreadth and content discrimination flaws in the
EEOC's approach."1
Having laid the groundwork of the 1991 Act, the Symposium
next turns directly to matters of statutory interpretation. In an article that is certain to have lasting significance well beyond the Civil
Rights context, Eric Schnapper of the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, and a strong proponent of the 1991 Act, undertakes a "legal autopsy" of what he terms judicial misinterpretation in sixteen
Supreme Court decisions, eight of which were overturned by the
1991 Act. Schnapper traces the fatal flaws in these opinions to
four principal causes: the pretense of relying upon plain meaning
when none exists; a reliance upon judicially-created presumptions
in the face of ambiguity that contradict the underlying purpose of
Congress; looking for the purpose of a statute in the arguments of
its opponents; and interpretations that are more extrapolations of
previous judicial opinions or a principle unrelated to the statute,
than the statute itself. As the above discussion suggests, Schnapper

1991,
29
30
31
Speech

68 NOTRE DAME L REV. 1037, 1045 (1993).
Id. at 1051.
RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environmenr. A Primer on Free
and Sxual Harassmnent, 68 NOTRE DAME L REv. 1003, 1004 (1993).
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is unlikely to get much disagreement on the absence of a plain
meaning in much of the 1991 Act. Unlike Rotunda, however, he is
less bothered by this. Schnapper prescribes that the Court confine
itself to interpretation that is based on legislative history
(something which Justice Scalia has expressly disavowed because of
its often manufactured nature), the purpose of the law, and some
consideration of the unfairness or irrationality of the result.3 2
Somewhat confusingly, however, Schnapper then disowns both text
and legislative history. Thus, with respect to the legislative history
of the 1964 Act and its statutory text that ostensibly disclaims quotas, Schnapper opines that both should be judicially disregarded
because the quota objection was "a political ruse" hiding "blatant,
malicious bigotry," and thus, the response assuring against quotas
was nothing more than "an equally political bit of posturing. " "
But if neither text nor legislative history governs statutory interpretation, the law becomes little more than what we say it is, and
then only because we say it.
Michael Carvin, formerly with the Civil Rights Division of the
Justice Department, opposed the 1991 Act in part because, in his
view, a disparate impact requirement is a straight-forward "government mandate for proportional quotas."'M Reading his paper, one
speculates that Carvin is likely to be cast by Eric Schnapper as a
clever misinterpreter of the statute.35 In his defense, Carvin
might plead that you cannot misinterpret that which is obtuse or
undefined. In this regard, Carvin interprets the 1991 Act as reversing Wards Cove with respect to the burden of proof (both production and persuasion)-shifting it from plaintiff employee to defendant employer-but, by virtue of Congress' non-definition of the
"business necessity" defense, leaving Wards Cove in place as to the
substance of that defense. While the statute provides that an employer must demonstrate that the challenged practice is "job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity," Carvin argues that the governing concept is job relatedness
since "[i]f a practice is job related, it is, by definition, consistent
with business necessity."' While leaving this terminology unde-

32 Eric Schnapper, Statutmy Misintapretatiomn A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L REV.
1095, 1117-18 (1993).
33 Id. at 1134-35.
34 Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the hew Title VII 68 NOTRE DAME L
REV. 1153, 1153 (1993).
35 Schnapper, supra note 32, at 1113.
36 Carvin, supra note 34, at 1158.
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fined, the 1991 Act does specify, as Carvin observes, that the language is to be understood in relation to Supreme Court opinions
prior to Wards Cov&-" Carvin responds, however, that "[tihere is
no hint in the [Wards Cove] opinion that [the Court's] understanding of this concept marked a departure from prior case law
"
or that Wards Cove otherwise overruled previous decisions. U
Were Carvin's interpretation to be accepted, the quota-impelling
impact of the codification of the disparate impact theory in the
1991 Act would be less fearsome. Obviously, however, much remains to be seen in the years of invited litigation that lie ahead.
The Symposium offered here is rich in analysis and, like the
statute under examination, hardly free of controversy or contradiction. But before concluding this brief introductory essay, there
is one last important puzzle to briefly touch upon-the philosophical one. This has already been implied by the suggested moral
difficulty in treating the absence of racial, gender, or other preference as discrimination. It is not hard to understand why this is
troubling-the introduction of preference, after all, does not exclude race or gender as irrelevant; it makes race or gender the
determining factor. In this, it seems to be a wholesale rejection of
the "colorblind" society Justice Harlan long ago in his dissent in
9 opined that we were meant to be.' The late
Plssy v. FergusonW
Thurgood Marshall, however, reminded us that Harlan's view was
that of a lone dissenter.4 For all too long, "separate but equal,"
or worse, was the order of the day. And, here, of course, is the
nub of the philosophical dilemma because while natural law enjoins us to disregard race, it also directs that we rectify harm.
Surely, the proponents of the 1991 Act conceived of the Act
as this rectification. What is less well understood is that opponents
of the Act may well have viewed their opposition in this light as
well. Avoiding a disparate impact theory that perpetuates invidious
classification .can, in itself, be said to be salutary. But more, the
opposition to the Act may also be put more broadly: that the
rectification of past societal harms by those who are not the direct
discriminating parties must rely not on government specification

37 Id. at 1160.
38 Id at 1162.
39 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40 Justice Harlan wrote: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens." Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41 Regents of University of the California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 392 (1978)
(opinion of Marshall, J.).
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or compulsion, but the practical reasoning and discovery of each
person's individual human nature within the context of family,
school, work, and church. More than anything else, the 1991 Act
symbolizes an unwillingness to rely upon these critical elements of
the natural law community to seek the good, including the inclusion of those who not only merit position but also suffer the illeffects of past discrimination. As it is, the 1991 Act not only imposes great uncertainty and costs upon these nongovernmental
communities vital to our well-being, but it also displaces them.
Eric Schnapper noted in his paper that 'Title VII applies to over
100 million employees working for several million employers," and
further that much of what was left undefined in the Act is traceable to the fact that "Congress abandoned the task as impossible,
in part because one side or another was always able to imagine yet
another possible application."' Maybe, just maybe, Congress
should have abandoned, nay trusted, the task altogether to the
reasoned judgment of each time and place and person in community.

42

Schnapper, supra note 32, at 1106.

